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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate Islamic radicalism in Malaysia. Qualitative study has been made to examine the meaning
of radicalism in the Malaysian context, some historical background and how this term is evolved over the period especially after
independence. Post September 11 also played a role in shaping the new meaning of radicalism in general and Islamic radicalism 
in particular. This paper suggests that ethnicity, fanaticism and idealism play major roles in shaping Malaysian population, 
especially Muslim.  
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. 
 1. Introductory Remarks 
This paper is basically deals with preliminary findings by a panel of an IRPA (intensive research of priority 
areas) research project on Islamic radicalism in Malaysia. The panel found that there is a clear demarcation, from 
etymological and epistemological perspectives, between the concepts of fundamentalism and radicalism in the sense 
that manifestations of fundamentalism do not necessarily lead to radicalism. Basically, radicalism was a by-product 
of a failed colonial and later on nationalist project. The imposition of colonial administration with its own values 
and modern bureaucratic system on traditional authority structure had led to protests by local fighters who sought 
Islam as its vehicle. After independence, the continued usage of bureaucratic and modern form of administration has 
led to a kind of contestation between official and unofficial Islam where the official Islam is seen as in line and 
supported the modern secular administration. One form of this support can be gauged from various efforts to  
mainstream Islam through the broadening of official Islam’s base. Fundamentally, there were two forms of reaction 
as a result of the failure of the nationalist project that is, religious radicalism and secular radicalism. Secular 
radicalism was manifested in the form of leftist, communist and socialist movements. In the Malaysian context, 
from preliminary observations, there were three forms of religious radicalism,. which had directly and/or indirectly 
to do with Islam.  Firstly, in the case of Gerakan Sabil Selendang Merah it was a form of religious revivalism (in 
this case Islam) based on Malay ethnicity. In other words it was an ethno-religious revivalism.  Secondly, religious 
radicalism characterized by fanaticism which also took the form deviationist teachings   as manifested in the Kerling 
Incident of 19 August 1978. Thirdly, religious radicalism motivated by idealism and ideological purity as can 
observed in the case of student movements of the 1970s.  These three forms of religious radicalism, in the Malaysian 
context, pinpoint to the fact that ethnicity plays dual functions: it could promote conflict as well as moderating it. 
1BFundamentalism and Radicalism: Etymological and Epistemological Bases 
From etymological perspective, based on authoritative dictionary definitions, the word ‘fundamental’ has the 
following meanings or connotations: it means foundation, essence, primary and important.  Furthermore, it could 
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mean a literal conception of truth. This means for a Westerner who espoused to the teachings of Christianity, will 
accept the literal truth of the Bible.  Similarly a devout Muslim will accept the literal truth of the Koran. Meanwhile, 
the word ‘radical’ can be defined as “ pertaining to, constituting, proceeding from, or going to the root”. The word 
‘radical’ could also mean fundamental, original, intrinsic, primary and primitive.Di
 What is interesting from the above definitions is the fact that the two terms have similarity in meanings and 
to a certain extent interchangeable.  From a purely definitional perspective, the two terms do not implicate the 
meaning of ‘extremism’ as is often equated by certain writers on Islam.  It is more the sociological dimension rather 
than the etymological or epistemological that led to radicalism. Too many conflicts and contradictions within the 
social order is certainly a factor conducive to radicalism and when the society (in this case the Muslim society) is 
experiencing division between values and experiences which they are unable to overcome, than radicalism will 
surface. DiiD
 Based on the above definition of the term ‘radical’ plus the experiences undergone by Islam, two broad 
understanding of radicalism can be offered here. Firstly, for a Muslim it is only logical and natural for him or her to 
go ‘to the root’ of the Islamic teachings.  However, in cases where Islam is not a hegemonic entity, this standpoint of 
‘going to the root’ might conflict with a hegemonic non-Islamic system.  Secondly, following the first, for those 
who uphold the hegemonic mainstream view would very likely to interpret the attempts by Muslims to adhere to the 
true teachings of Islam as something abnormal if not irrational.  Worst still such acts by Muslims is viewed as 
‘primitive’ and at once ‘extremist’. 
 For a normal Muslim such attitudes by the West are something very puzzling. The West ‘irrational’ 
behavior towards Muslims is quite obvious especially after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1992.  There was this 
spontaneity on the part of the West to point their fingers toward Muslims and declared that the Muslims have taken 
the place vacated by Communism and conveniently labeled the Muslims, especially the Islamic movements, as the 
‘new Communism’. This attitude of the West towards the Muslims is very interesting knowing too well the fact that 
most Muslim countries could still be categorized as developing countries.  Presently, not even a single Muslim 
country could be considered as having the status of a middle power less so a great power.  In other words the 
Muslims, as a whole is weak militarily and economically. One interesting question to ask at this juncture is: Why the 
West is so prejudice towards the Muslims while knowing too well that the Muslims as a whole is very weak?  
 The West worried too much about Islam to the extent that it took the form of a phobia.  For writers such as 
S Sayyid (2003) this phobia towards Islam is labeled as hauntology and this has got to do with the West’s 
conception of Islamic fundamentalism. According to S Sayyid (2003: 3) the present Islamic revivalism and the 
West’s unfounded worries towards them is basically a form of the return of the repressed.  The West who had 
colonized the majority of the present Muslim states had the guilty conscience in the sense that the colonial 
experience had haunted the thinking of the West.  
Islam as a religion of liberation stood up against their colonial masters and those who surreptitiously cooperated 
with them.  In this sense Islam denounced imperialism and also consequently neo-imperialism.  Specifically this 
attitude of Islam can be construed as political.  At a more general level, “…the Islamic revival signals a cultural 
anxiety in the West. The West sees in Islam the distorted mirror of its own past. It marks the rebirth of the God they 
had killed so that Man (sic) could live.  The Islamic resurgence marks the revenge of God; it signals the return of 
faith, the return of all that puts into question the idea of the progressive liberation of humanity” (S Sayyid 2003: 4).   
 The different interpretations of the concept of Islamic fundamentalism are also a function of intellectual 
divergence.  Intellectual divergence or gap could set in where there is a conflict in the interpretations of the Koran: 
the literalist as opposed to the contextual.  In other words one has to differentiate between the doctrinal and affective 
structures of Islam.  Conflicting interpretations will complicate the existing socio-political realities of a Muslim 
society, which was construed as something that is going against the basic teachings of Islam especially as regards 
the question of justice. This interpretive conflict is however, basically an internal affair. 
 Interpretive conflict could have its own external dimension as a result of differing worldviews or tassawur.
A worldview that is sharply defined and simultaneously exclusive could easily be in conflict with a worldview that 
is intrinsically different such as that of the West.  This will exclude whatever opportunities there is for a sharing of 
worldviews on the plain of permissibility (mubah); or from the point of view of strategic thinking, within the area of 
the makruh (permissible but not encouraged). The differing worldviews that are basically exclusive will be prone to 
conflict.  In this case it is not surprising for a Western man with its own worldview which is intrinsically biased; 
view a Muslim man coming to grip with the fundamental teaching of Islam as something radical or worst still as 
something primitive.  This attitude is irrational and within the Southeast Asian context, such an attitude that is bereft 
of rationality can pose its own security threat. DiiiD In contrast, from the perspective of Islamic tassawur the return of a 
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Muslim to the fundamental teachings of Islam is something good and necessary.  It has its own positive connotations 
in the sense that such a comeback is something original and intrinsic.
A History of Islamic Radicalism: Some Case Studies 
In the early part of the paper it has been mentioned that in the Malaysian case there existed three forms of 
religious/Islamic radicalism.  What is interesting in the three cases cited was the crucial role played by ethnicity in 
the sense that each ethnic group subscribes to different religious teachings.  Even though student movements of the 
1970s were purportedly triggered by Islamic idealism, student leadership was principally led by student leaders of 
Malay origin. 
 In the case of Gerakan Tentera Sabil Selendang Merah which took place on September 1945, it can be 
categorized as a form of ethno-religious revivalism.  This movement was under the leadership of one Haji Salleh 
Abdul Karim.  In the hope of enhancing his leadership legitimacy, he was also known as a Kiyai. The majority of the 
membership of this movement came from Malays of Javanese and Banjarese descent.  It was an auspicious 
movement since it covered the whole of the state of Johore. This movement was initiated in response to the militant 
acts by ethnic Chinese upon ethnic Malays.  Such militant acts by ethnic Chinese were principally manipulated by 
Bintang Tiga. DivD These ethnic conflicts worsen when it was linked with religious questions.  The religious sentiment 
was at its highest when a mosque was used as a slaughter house for pigs. This act was seen by the Malays as a direct 
challenge to Islam.  The Malays retaliated by attacking ethnic Chinese.  The attack on Parit Sulong was successful 
but the attack on Parit Jawa was partially failed. At the height of the conflict, the movement had it long term aim of 
totally cleansing the ethnic Chinese. However, this long- term plan was put to a stop by Dato’ Onn Jaafar, a well-
known Malay nobility who latter founded UMNO. 
 In sum, the movement was a religious movement fanned by ethnicity.  There were some mystical elements 
involved in the sense that the leader of the movement was alleged to have received a ‘Calling’(seruan) from God, 
the usage of special red shawl and blessed water as sources of strength.  The calls to jihad were also frequently 
invoked. 
 Islamic radicalism fuelled by fanaticism can be clearly seen in the case of the Kerling Incident that took 
place on 19 August 1978.  In this Incident there was a group of Muslim youth who wrongly interpreted the notions 
of jihad and shahid (martyrdom). They had the impression that destroying temples was a way of the Prophet and a 
form of jihad and if they were killed in the process they would be considered as shahid.  As a result, four Muslim 
youth were battered to death by the temple keeper.  What is clear in this Incident was a case of Islamic radicalism 
nurtured by elements of fanaticism and could also be considered as a deviation from the mainstream teachings of 
Islam. 
 Islamic radicalism initiated by elements of idealism can be seen in the Malaysian  context  in the form of 
student demonstrations of the 1970s specifically the Baling Incident of 1974.  This is understandable since students 
are usually attached to what is known as ‘ideological purity’ in the sense they are not as yet subscribed to the more 
practical values in life.  Their focus on the issue of poverty reflected to a certain extent the socialistic influence in 
the then life of students. The socialist thinking was imparted through Socialist Club of the University of Malaya.  
While notwithstanding the influence of Socialism had on the life of the students in the late 1970s, the Islamic 
elements was still the dominant influence in the sense that the leader of the student movement was finally active in 
the most influential of the Islamic Non-governmental Organization, the ABIM.  
 Reflecting on the three forms of Islamic radicalism as had happened in Malaysia, it can be safely argued 
that the last two versions were indirectly influenced by such event as the Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s which 
took the world by storm, more so the Muslim countries.  In this case, Malaysia was of no exception. The ethno-
religious conflicts are still potentially dangerous in plural society like the Malaysian where each ethnic is identified 
with a specific religion.  This has proven to be true in the recent Kampung Medan Incident which took place in 
2001, which involved ethnic Malays and Indians.  This recent conflict despite having ethno-religious character was 
also influenced by cultural as well as local social realities.  
Modernism and Islamic Radicalism
The single most important factor that shaped the affective structure of Islam is the phenomenon of modernism 
itself. Official Islam is more at ease with modernism as opposed to unofficial Islam.  Unofficial Islam is more 
cautious with modernism in the understanding that the foundation of modernism is secularism, a form of ideology 
which is totally opposed to Islam. This view seems to be in line with the usage of terms like secular modernity by 
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authors like Armstrong (2000).  For Armstrong, the existence of a phenomenon termed secular modernity has 
unavoidably caused piety to go through a process of transformation, which ended up it having a militant character.  
This unavoidable transformation does not only happen in the case of Islam but also with other great religion such 
Christianity (Armstrong 2000: vii).  This finding by Armstrong is indeed very important: That religious 
fundamentalism was a result of a shared factor, modernism. 
 The failures of nationalists in power in managing change termed modernism will influence the nature and 
treatment of Islam itself.  If the nationalists in power in seen as having an amicable relationship with forces of 
secular modernism, then there is the possibility that the Islamic groups will portray a tougher and perhaps radical 
stand towards the prevailing authority.  The nationalists in power have to really push through a scheme of things that 
will ultimately be seen as a dichotomy separating modernization and westernization.  Modernization efforts do not 
necessarily mean dovetailing the West. The Look East Policy and an approach to development according to 
indigenous or local specifications (acuan sendiri) as introduced by Mahathir can be seen as efforts at establishing 
such a dichotomy although the effectiveness of such approaches is still debatable. Modernization based on 
indigenous or local specifications will be less prejudicial to the Islamists and hence it is easier for nationalist leaders 
to offer “a constructive and peaceful accommodation between Islam and modernism”(Rubenstein 2000: 17). 
 Accommodating Islam with constructive modernism seems to the option taken by the Malaysian 
government especially during the era of Islamic revivalism of the late 1970s.  What is interesting in the Malaysian 
case is that Islam and ethnicity is fused into an inseparable entity and hence Islamic revivalism is seen as 
synonymous with the strengthening of Malay identity. When the word Malay is mentioned, it takes into 
consideration not only PAS members but also UMNO members. Cognizant of this fact that the government 
introduced its own strategy when dealing with the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism. The strategy is simply termed 
as ‘inculcation of Islamic values’ (penerapan nilai-nilai Islam).  The strategy is one of two-pronged: It slowed down 
the tempo of Islamic revivalism by not allowing the Islamic political party such as the PAS to optimize such a 
development (and making them more radical in the process) and more importantly, it took into account the possible 
impact of the development among the UMNO members itself. 
 Lacking programs or policies that could institutionalize the rise of Islam will certainly make Islam more 
radical; it is more disrupting if this radical spirit spread among UMNO members.  It is easier to use state’s coercive 
instruments on PAS followers than on UMNO members.  The strategic role of UMNO vis-à-vis radical Islam can be 
gauged from the uneasiness of think thank like Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs who is afraid of UMNO moving 
into a more conservative position, let alone radical.  On this, the Center has this to say: “ There is the danger that a 
more conservative UMNO will use Islam for partisan purposes and pick up on the prevailing Islamist sentiment….” 
(Rubenstein, 2000:12). However, it is almost unlikely for UMNO to be conservative and less so radical in the near 
future.  The influence of the non-Muslims especially the Chinese within BN has somewhat moderated UMNO’s 
position towards Islam. What more the Chinese votes (around 21%) did save UMNO’s dignity during the General 
Election of 1999. 
Islamic Radicalism and Foreign Policy
Few semi-intelligent reports regarding the future of Islam in Southeast Asia show some interesting trends.  Some 
of these trends indicate that whether Islam will move towards a more radical posture or the reverse depends more on 
the nature of economics and politics of the countries concerned.  In terms of economic growth, Indonesia is riskier 
compared to Malaysia.  Secondly, there is this factor of foreign policy specifically the capability of Islamic 
international organizations, especially those from the Middle East, to establish cordial relations with Islamic 
organizations in countries in Southeast Asia. This is easily understood since the September 11 Tragedy and the 
conflicts that ensued mainly involved Muslims from the Middle East and the Muslims from the Middle East are seen 
as capable of exporting the radical version of Islam. Increased intake of students, especially at the post-graduate 
level, and tourists from the Middle East to Malaysia should be seen as a relevant factor to be taken into 
consideration.  Thirdly, from 2001 up to 2006 and beyond, countries like Malaysia and Indonesia will be offering a 
more spirited foreign policies and more vocal in championing the Muslims predicaments at the global level. Dv
 The more spirited foreign policies can be seen in Malaysia’s attitude towards the recent killings of some 87 
Muslims in Tak Bai, Southern Thailand. Malaysian Parliament unanimously condemned the Incident and criticized 
Thailand of her high-handed in handling the demonstrations by Muslims.  The position taken by the Malaysian 
Parliament can be seen running against the spirit of ASEAN where member countries should not interfere with the 
internal affairs of member states. This seems to be in line with some of the initial findings of the IRPA research 
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project mentioned earlier.  This is so in cases where intensive interviews were held with a few UMNO leaders at 
divisional level.  They strongly condemned the Tak Bai Incident and disregarded the notion of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of ASEAN member states.  Similar views were voiced by divisional leaders of PBB in Sarawak. 
D
vi
D All the divisional leaders interviewed were very concerned with what is happenings with the Muslims presently 
and the role of people like Osama ben Laden is necessary, even though not sufficient, in uplifting the morale of the 
Muslims.  The leaders interviewed also agreed that the Palestinian issues must be solved immediately.  What is more 
interesting in the case of the Palestinian issue is the fact there are views that wanted the issue to be solved not only 
using diplomatic means but also force like using suicide bombers.  This finding is an important one that is 
international issues that involve the Muslims, which are seen as being victimized and there is no serious effort in 
solving it, will ultimately radicalized official and mainstream Islam.  This is in line with the more spirited foreign 
policies of Malaysia as mentioned earlier.  
 Referring more to internal or domestic issues, the majority of the respondent that were intensively 
interviewed dismissed the fact that the concept of Islamic fundamentalism should be associated with Islamic 
radicalism.  A committed Muslim will not necessarily be radical.  The majority of the respondents also did not agree 
that Islam should variously be labeled as radical, moderate and political.  There is only one Islam. For them Islamic 
radicalism is essentially a non-issue of whether it will surface in times of political instability or otherwise.
 However, there was one respondent who only partially agreed with the view that Islamic radicalism 
occurred as a result of the failures of colonial or nationalist projects. In general it can be said that there are a lot of 
similar or shared views among those representing governmental political parties like the UMNO, the opposition 
such as PAS and leaders of the Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations.  What is more interesting is the fact that 
more than half (53%) of ordinary respondents, especially those from Peninsular Malaysia, rejected the assertion that 
PAS is a radical political party. By contrast, only 23.8% of the respondents consider PAS as a radical political party. 
Similarly, 62.5 % respondents considered UMNO not a radical political party. In contrast, some 53% and 54% of 
respondents respectively agreed that such underground and surreptitious movements like Kumpulan Militan 
Malaysia (KMM) and al-Maunah are indeed radical movements.  These movements can also be regarded as Islamic 
deviationist movements that had radical tendencies.  
Conclusion
This paper has put forward some important albeit preliminary findings from an IRPA research project regarding 
Islamic radicalism in Malaysia. DviiD The historical survey provided in the first part of the paper has identified three 
forms of religious (meaning Islamic) radicalism in Malaysia that involved factors of ethnicity, fanaticism and 
idealism. What is pertinent in these cases was, and still is, is the factor of ethnicity playing dual roles: it could 
enhance or moderate Islamic radicalism.  Secondly, the arguments in the paper point to the fact that the West’s 
attitude toward Islam should and could be more rational and realistic.   Thirdly, and in the Malaysian context, factors 
that have connections with the Muslims, especially at the international level such as the Palestinian issue, somehow 
‘radicalized’ the official or mainstream Islam. Fourthly, there are congruent viewpoints among the leaders of 
UMNO, PAS and Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations like ABIM as regard Islamic radicalism.  What is more 
interesting and contrary to most Western writings on Islam in Malaysia, more than half of the respondents 
interviewed did not regard PAS as a radical political party.     
i
 The above definitions are from Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary (1976). 
ii
 On this see Shahrom TM Sulaiman, Terorisme Global dan Pengganas Agama: Cabaran Hidup Beragama Pada Alaf Baru. Utusan Publications 
& Distributors Sdn. Bhd. Kuala Lumpur, 2002.p.118 
iii
 Compare the view put forward by Joshua Kurlantzick in an article entiled ‘On Faith’ which was published in New Republic, Washington, June 
12, 2000 which says “ Not that Islam doesn’t pose a threat to Southeast Asia. It does—an irrational fear of it could overshadow legitimate 
security concerns – If those problems are not addressed, Southeast Asia could become scarier than even the spinners of doomsday fundamentalist 
scenarios imagine…”. 
iv
 A Communist-inspired organization with largely Chinese membership which vowed to oust British and Japanese rule in Malaya.  It was against 
the Malays since the British and the Japanese accorded special positions to the Malays under their administrations.  
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v
 One of the reports in question is from USCINCPAC Virtual Information Center which has issued a special report entitled ‘Is Islam a Threat to 
Southeast Asia?’ prepared by Mel C. Labrador coded (808) 477-0304, dated 29 Mac 2001. 
vi
 The PBB is the most important political party within the BN coalition in Sarawak, equivalent to UMNO at the national level. 
vii
 The actual title of research is “ Muslim Society’s Perception Regarding Radicalism in Malaysia”  
involving some 2000 respondents throughout Malaysia. 
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